{"id":7995,"date":"2025-09-25T15:15:48","date_gmt":"2025-09-25T19:15:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cntiwpedev.wpenginepowered.com\/?p=7995"},"modified":"2025-10-04T09:51:59","modified_gmt":"2025-10-04T13:51:59","slug":"addressing-disinformation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cnti.org\/issue-primers\/addressing-disinformation\/","title":{"rendered":"Addressing Disinformation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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CNTI’s Summary<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Publishers, platforms and policymakers share a responsibility to respond to growing concerns around disinformation. It is increasingly important to understand and navigate challenging trade-offs between curbing problematic content and protecting independent journalism and fundamental human rights. Efforts to stem misinformation must ensure that governments cannot determine the news that the public receives or serve as arbitrators of truth or intent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Legislation should articulate high-level goals, understand that initiatives in one country or online context inherently impacts other contexts and delegate enforcement to independent bodies with clear structures for transparency and accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The Issue<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The spread of false and misleading information is not a new<\/a> problem<\/a> and appears in many forms: online and offline<\/a>, through public and private channels and across a variety of mediums. In a world with growing digital media platforms (where false and misleading information is rapidly spread and, at times, amplified<\/a>), new technologies for digital manipulation<\/a>, political upheavals in the Global North<\/a>, coordinated election<\/a> disinformation<\/a> and hostile<\/a> propaganda<\/a> campaigns<\/a>, problematic COVID-19<\/a> information,<\/a> rampant denial<\/a> of climate science<\/a> and declining trust in institutions<\/a> and news<\/a>, the credibility of information the public gets online<\/em> has become a global concern. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of particular importance, and the focus of this primer, is the impact of disinformation<\/a> \u2013 false<\/a>information created or spread with the intention to deceive or harm \u2013 on electoral processes, political violence and information systems around the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Disinformation is distinct from but often used interchangeably with terms like misinformation (which is also false, but may be benign and can be spread without the intention of harm) or malinformation (which is also intentionally harmful, but is not necessarily false). With this in mind, CNTI chooses to use the term disinformation given its (1) falsity and (2) malicious intent. This primer addresses the opportunities and challenges that come with legislative policy responses to disinformation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

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The level and impact of disinformation campaigns around the world have a wide range. Disinformation may come from people doctoring photos<\/a> and creating memes<\/a> that go viral, transnational<\/a> actors<\/a> and trolls<\/a> seeking to sow distrust and confusion<\/a>, and elected officials<\/a> attempting to win<\/a> elections<\/a>, maintain<\/a> power<\/a> or incite hatred<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Governments around the world are taking action to curb disinformation: some with the goal of supporting an informed citizenry<\/a> and others with the goal of undermining it<\/a>. Actions taken by one entity can impact other countries when groups in one country learn from and model<\/a> successful efforts elsewhere. Digital platforms<\/a> and interest groups have also put in place content<\/a> moderation<\/a> processes to stem disinformation (though some platforms have begun to move<\/a> away<\/a> from these efforts), but these can vary by language<\/a> and context<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among the many well-intended legislative proposals to address disinformation, one overarching concern is that the vagueness of what constitutes disinformation (especially the difficulty of interpreting actors\u2019 intent<\/em>) can result in policy that controls the press and limits free expression. Even legislation aimed at supporting an informed citizenry can potentially lead to restrictions on both the news media and the general public<\/a> within a country. Further, policies that target disinformation can easily serve as models for authoritarian regimes<\/a> or antidemocratic actors<\/a> to exploit. In these cases, the actual \u2013 and, at times, intended<\/em> \u2013 effects are restriction of media<\/a> freedom<\/a>, censorship of opposing voices and control of free expression. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, it is critical to balance the opportunities and risks of policy responses to the challenge of disinformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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What Makes It Complex<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

A core challenge in addressing disinformation with policy is a lack of agreement on the definition of disinformation and what kinds of content constitute it:<\/strong> The term itself is often interchanged with similarly opaque concepts such as misinformation, malinformation, information disorder and the particularly contested term \u201cfake news.\u201dDetermining which content fits within each category is subject to disagreement and is often politicized. To the public, these terms are used to encompass anything from poor or sensationalized journalism and fabricated content to political propaganda and hyper-partisan content. As challenging as it may be, it is important to strive for a clear and consistent understanding of what disinformation is. Without such agreement, developing effective measures to support an informed citizenry and safeguard an independent press has the added challenge of needing to withstand differences among these labels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Addressing disinformation is critical, but some regulative approaches can put press freedom and human rights at great risk: <\/strong>Governments\u2019 involvement in decisions around content can allow them to serve as the arbiters of what content appears online, with potentially dangerous consequences for an independent press and free expression. Legislation may intentionally target specific groups<\/a>, including journalists, political opponents and activists, and it may include loopholes that allow for suppression or censorship. Legislation intended to support an informed public may also unintentionally stem speech protected under the basic human right to express ideas. Further, legislation that is effective in one context may introduce different risks in another. Prohibiting acts of expression, particularly using vague or undefined terms, can infringe upon international human rights<\/a> laws. If measures against disinformation are selectively or unequally enforced \u2014 whether by police, regulatory bodies or technology companies \u2014 they can be used as a tool for crushing political dissent, impinging upon freedom of opinion and paving the way for illegal surveillance<\/a> or self-censorship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Adopting measures<\/a> such as blocks or bans to combat disinformation can allow state actors to exercise undue control over the flow of information and can isolate users from an open, global internet<\/a>: <\/strong>Governments\u2019 involvement in decisions around content can allow them to serve as the arbiters of what content appears online, with potentially dangerous consequences for an independent press For example, when state actors apply blocks and bans to journalists they may harm both the freedom of the press and citizens\u2019 basic right to access and share ideas and information, both of which impact people\u2019s participation in public and political life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It may not be possible to develop disinformation interventions that suit all digital contexts:<\/strong> The various forms, contexts and audiences in the online space introduce different (and unequal) harms and risks. For instance, users of encrypted messaging apps<\/a> such as WhatsApp or Telegram in India, Brazil and elsewhere have differing rights to and expectations of privacy and reach than users of Twitter<\/a> or Reddit. Even within the same platform, structured spaces can vary from public to private. Dismantling<\/a> encrypted spaces, in particular, does little to combat disinformation and discourages free expression. Another major challenge is in determining which platforms and which countries fall under the parameters of a piece of legislation. This is further complicated by the fact that U.S.-based technology companies\u2019 levels of cultural expertise and engagement lessen the further they get from the U.S., which means the effectiveness of efforts to combat disinformation vary. Finally, disjointed efforts to combat online disinformation risk contributing to a fragmented<\/a> internet<\/a>, in which people\u2019s online experiences vary by country or region. We address this issue in a separate issue primer<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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State of Research<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In recent years, as governments, platforms and funders turned their attention and investments toward policy<\/a> and technical solutions to address mis- and disinformation (though this has started to wane<\/a>), academic and media attention to the topic has dramatically increased. The research to date has produced helpful insights<\/a>, including putting the scope<\/a> of mis- and disinformation in<\/a> context<\/a> with other online content. The research field also has several shortcomings<\/a> that reveal the need for a deeper and more global approach:<\/p>\n\n\n\n