Discussions about how to guard against disinformation and encourage the delivery of fact-based news are critical. In working toward the best actionable outcomes, these discussions need to consider both the potential and realized impact of recent legislative policies related to this topic. This study focuses specifically on policies laid out as guarding against \u201cfake news.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Legislation targeting \u201cfake news\u201d \u2014 a contested term<\/a> used to reference both news and news providers that governments (or others) reject as well as disinformation campaigns \u2014 has increased significantly over the last few years, particularly in the wake of COVID-19<\/a>. This study finds that even when technically aimed at curbing disinformation<\/a>, the majority of \u201cfake news\u201d laws, either passed or actively considered from 2020 to 2023, lessen the protection of an independent press and risk the public\u2019s open access to a plurality of fact-based news.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, governments can \u2014 and have<\/a> \u2014 used<\/a> this type of legislation to label independent journalism as \u201cfake news\u201d or disinformation. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists<\/a>, among the 363 reporters jailed around the world in 2022, 39 were imprisoned for \u201cfake news\u201d or disinformation policy violations. Even within well-intended legislative policies, like Germany\u2019s laws<\/a> which focus on platform moderation of \u201cillegal content\u201d related to hate speech and Holocaust denial, concerns<\/a> can arise<\/a> over potential government censorship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cFake news\u201d policies analyzed in this report, proposed or enacted in 31 countries between 2020 and 2023. Eleven of those countries have national elections this year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Policies examined where “fake” or “false” news is explicitly defined \u2014 leaving the important task of interpreting what is fake or false to the designated oversight authority, often the government. Two policies explicitly define journalism or what might be considered \u201creal\u201d news.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Policies examined that clearly define who has authority to arbitrate what is or is not “fake news,” sometimes the central government and other times an entity within it whose independence is often unclear. The remaining 18 offer either vague or no language. Oversight power in the hands of the government \u2014 whether explicitly or by default \u2014 introduces greater risk of governmental press control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n of the 31 countries examined currently have autocratic tendencies, identified by the research organization V-Dem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Number of the examined policies with where the penalties include imprisonment \u2014 ranging from less than one month to up to 20 years. 27 of the policies clearly noted penalties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
32<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cnti.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/fake-news-countries.webp\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n7<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cnti.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/fake-news-7.webp\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n14<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cnti.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/fake-news-14.webp\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n19<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cnti.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/fake-news-autocracies.webp\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n20<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/cnti.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/fake-news-20.webp\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n\n\n\n